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STATE POWER TO TAX PERSONALTY
ON FEDERAL RESERVATIONS
The fact that the federal government is the greatest landed pro-
prietor in America is perhaps rendered less striking by the fact that all
of its continental holdings are necessarily situated within the physical
borders of another sovereign.' At once these Federal "islands" or "en-
claves" appear to be subject to the authority of two masters, each of
whom, within its own particular sphere, is supreme. Although con-
flicts between the federal and state sovereigns may arise in numerous
situations, this comment is primarily concerned with those conflicts
arising from states' efforts to tax property located within a federal
territory.2 An inquiry into this problem will of necessity involve a pre-
liminary examination of the development of federal jurisdiction over
such lands.
I. HISTORiCAL DEVELOPMENT
It should first be noted that clause 17 of section 8, article I, of the
United States Constitution specifically authorizes the federal govern-
ment to acquire by purchase3 such lands as it needs for the erection
of forts, arsenals, dock-yards, etc.4 The early Congresses, however, in
'Excepting the District of Columbia.
'More specifically, may a state levy an ad valorem tax on personal property lo-
cated in a federally-held territory?
3Acquisition of land by purchase, with the consent of the state concerned, is
specifically authorized by the United States Constitution. Questions dealing with
the acquisition of lands by the federal government should be distinguished from
the related problem covered by this comment-i.e., the acquisition of jurisdiction
over those lands to which the United States obtains title. Other modes of acquisition
of lands will herein be assumed to exist without attempting to trace their develop-
ment or to support them by the Constitution. In general, such other modes include
condemnation through the power of eminent domain, either with or without the
state's consent to such proceedings; donation; and reservation from the public
domain at the time a state is admitted into the Union.
'U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 17: "To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Govern-
ment of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings...."
[hereinafter referred to as clause 17]. (Emphasis added.) This particular authori-
zation was not contained in the first drafts of the Constitution. III Farrand, The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 595, 598 (rev. ed. 1937); II Farrand,
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their acts providing for the purchase of lands, did not generally include
express requirements for the obtaining of federal jurisdiction.5 Evi-
dently, the United States merely purchased lands under the authority
of clause 17 and entered into occupancy with but little regard for the
problem of legislative jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in 1811, a state court
recognized that where the federal government had purchased land
under the terms of clause 17, the power of legislation vested in the
United States. 6 Since that time, both federal and state courts have
noted that the United States may acquire jurisdiction over state lands
by virtue of clause 17.7
During this development, the Supreme Court, in Fort Leavenworth
R.R. v. Lowe,8 recognized another method of acquiring jurisdiction-
state cession. There, the lands in question had been held by the United
States prior to the admission of Kansas as a state, and no retention of
jurisdiction was claimed by the United States when Kansas was ad-
mitted. Later, Kansas ceded jurisdiction to the federal government, and
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the cession as a
valid transfer of jurisdiction. "As already stated, the land constituting
the Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation was not purchased, but
was owned by the United States... ; and whatever political sovereignty
and dominion the United States has over the place comes from the ces-
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 324 (rev. ed. 1937). However, sub-
sequent proposed drafts did contain an expression of this authority. II Farrand,
op. cit. supra, at 5o9. Even then, though, it seems to have been thought of in
terms of being a logical adjunct to the exclusive authority of the federal govern-
ment over the seat of its administration. The Federalist No. 43, at 219 (Beloff ed.
1948) (Madison). It may be seen from Madison's discussion of clause 17 that ap-
parently little emphasis was placed upon the second part of that clause.
The term "needful buildings" in clause 17 has by judicial interpretation been
expanded to include almost any construction necessary for the carrying out of a
proper federal function-e.g., court building and customhouse, Sharon v. Hill,
24 Fed. 726, 730, 731 (C.C.D. Cal. 1885); locks and dams, United States v. Tucker,
122 Fed. 518, 522 ('W.D. Ky. 19o3); post offices, Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36,
37 (19o8); Indian training school, United States v. Wurtzbarger, 276 Fed. 753, 755
(D. Ore. 1921); hotel, Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 451 (1929).
51 Stat. 129 (1790); 1 Stat. 622 (1799); 2 Stat. 496 (18o8); 2 Stat. 65o (1811). But
see 1 Stat. 452 (1796); 2 Stat. 659 (1811).
0Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811).
7James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 3o2 U.S. 134 (1937); Surplus Trading Co. v.
Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (193o); United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14,867
(C.C.D. R.I. 1819); Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869).
8 114 U.S. 525 (1885). Probably there was no distinction made between the
words consent and cession prior to 1885. Interdepartmental Committee for the
Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States, Jurisdiction Over
Federal Areas Within the States-Pt. II, A Text of the Law of Legislative Jurisdiction
73 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report, Pt. II].
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sion of the State ....9 Transfer of jurisdiction by state cession has
since been well established. 10
The United States may also obtain jurisdiction over lands located
within a state by reservation of such jurisdiction over the public
domain at the time the state concerned is admitted to the Union."
"Congress might undoubtedly, upon such admission [of the state into
the Union], have stipulated for retention of the political authority,
dominion and legislative power of the United States over the Reserva-
vation... ; that is, it could have excepted the place from the jurisdic-
tion of [the state], as one needed for the uses of the general govern-
ment."' 2
From the outset, cases dealing with state cession and federal reserva-
tion as a mode of transfer of jurisdiction established the fact that
the United States, in order to effect a valid transfer, did not have to
acquire exclusive jurisdiction.' 3 Rather, states were allowed to make
certain reservations of jurisdiction in their cession statutes, and the
federal government was permitted to refrain from reserving to itself all
jurisdiction, to the end that there was created in fact a concurrent juris-
diction between the state and national governments.' 4 In this situa-
tion the state law, as amended from time to time, continues to govern
the ceded area, and thus there is no tendency, due to congressional in-
action, for general laws applicable in the area to become obsolete.
Similarly, problems dealing with the residency of citizens of the state
0114 U.S. 525, 539 (1885).
"Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939); Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S.
518 (1938); Standard Oil Co. of California v. California, 291 U.S. 242 (1934); Battle v.
United States, 209 U.S. 36 (19o8); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
"Langford v. Monteith, 1o2 U.S. 145 (188o); Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe,
114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885) (dictum). See also 26 Stat. 222 (189o); 34 Stat. 267, 272 (19o6),
16 U.S.C. § 153 (1952). It is recognized that this mode of transfer of jurisdiction is
of little practical value today. Its sole significance, perhaps, lies in the explanation
it affords as regards the jurisdiction enjoyed by the United States over certain lands
it already possesses.
"Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526 (1885). See also Langford v.
Monteith, 102 U.S. 145 (188o); Clay v. State, 4 Kan. 49 (1886).
"Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1885); Arlington Hotel Co. v.
Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929); James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 3o9 U.S. 94 (1940).
"See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 3o2 U.S. 134, 149 (1937). By definition the
term concurrent jurisdiction "is applied in those instances wherein in granting to
the United States authority which would otherwise amount to exclusive legislative
jurisdiction over an area, the State concerned has reserved to itself the right to
exercise, concurrently with the United States, all of the same authority." Interde-
partmental Committee for the Study of Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within
the States, Jurisdiction Over Federal Areas Within the States-Pt. I, The Facts and
Committee Recommendations 14 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Committee Report, Pt.
I].
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are less likely to arise than in a situation where exclusive jurisdiction is
in the United States.1 5
This was not, however, the result initially as to lands acquired by the
federal government under clause 17. Where such purchase is made with
the consent of the state concerned, clause 17 gives Congress the power
to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the lands in all cases whatso-
ever.' 6 It was early believed that the United States could not purchase
lands under this clause unless it did acquire exclusive jurisdiction.
This has been the traditional view, from the time Madison sought
ratification of the Constitution,'7 through early cases considering the
problem,'3 and into the first quarter of the twentieth century.19 This
view was strengthened by a joint resolution of Congress in 1841, pro-
viding that thereafter no public money could be expended for public
buildings or works on lands purchased by the United States until the
state legislature had consented to the purchase.23 0 This enactment seems
to have had the effect of implementing the provisions of clause 17 in
suggesting that perhaps the United States did not have the power to
purchase lands unless it also acquired exclusive jurisdiction over those
lands by virtue of state consent and the operation of clause 17. "For it
may well be doubted whether Congress is, by the terms of the Consti-
Those persons living in the enclave, in addition to whatever federal status
they may acquire, maintain their state citizenship, under which they receive state
benefits in return for the performance of state obligations.
16Although clause 17 uses the words exclusive legislation, the Supreme Court
has construed this to be synonymous with exclusive jurisdiction. "The constitutional
provision says that Congress shall have power to exercise 'exclusive legislation in
all cases whatsoever' over a place so purchased for such a purpose. 'Exclusive legis-
lation' is consistent only with exclusive jurisdiction. It can have no other meaning
as to the seat of government, and what it means as to that it also means as to forts,
magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, etc." Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652
(93o). "E]xclusive jurisdiction is the attendant upon exclusive legislation .... [I]f
exclusive jurisdiction and exclusive legislation do not import the same thing, the
state could not cede or the United States accept for the purposes enumerated in this
clause [clause 17], any exclusive jurisdiction. And such was manifestly the avowed
intention of those wise and great men who framed the Constitution." United States
v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 648, No. 14,867 (C.C.D. R.I. 1819).
1 7 The Federalist No. 43, at 219 (Beloff ed. 1948) (Madison).
IUnited States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, No. 14,867 (C.C.D. R.I. 18ig); Com-
monwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72 (1811).
"Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (193o); United States v. Unzeuta,
281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930) (dictum).
"Rev. Stat. § 355 (1875), 40 US.C. § 255 (1934): "No public money shall be
expended upon any site or land purchased by the United States for the purposes of
erecting thereon any armory, arsenal, fort, fortification, navy-yard, custom-house,
light-house, or other public building, of any kind whatsoever, until the written
opinion of the Attorney-General shall be had in favor of the validity of the title,
nor until the consent of the legislature of the State in which the land or site may
be, to such purchase, has been given." (Emphasis added.)
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tution, at liberty to purchase lands for forts, dock-yards, &c., with the
consent of the State Legislature, where such consent is so qualified that
it will not justify the exclusive legislation of Congress there. It may
well be doubted if such consent be not utterly void."21
The theory behind the operation of exclusive jurisdiction is that the
federal government displaces all state jurisdiction as to the ceded
area.22 Nevertheless, it seems that courts have sanctioned the reserva-
tion to the states of the right of service of process, both criminal and
civil, within such an area.23 Outside of this right, the state is without
jurisdiction. Problems arise, however, from the fact that while Con-
gress has legislated extensively for the District of Columbia, it has not,
except in particular instances, legislated for other territories under its
exclusive jurisdiction.24 These problems are increased by the fact that
"Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 534 (1885).
-'2In the exercise of such power as to an area in a State the Federal Government
theoretically displaces the State in which the area is contained of all its sovereign
authority, executive and judicial as well as legislative." Committee Report, Pt. I, 13.
23There seems never to have been any difficulty arising from the state's reten-
tion in its consent statute of the power of criminal and civil service of process.
Though the reason generally assigned for the support of such a reservation is that
it will prevent the federally-owned territory from becoming a haven for fugitives
and criminals, it seems that such a reservation has always been valid whether or not
a reason was assigned. Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 657 (1930); United
States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143 (1930); United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas.
646, 649, No. 14,867 (C.C.D. R.I. 1819); Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72, 75 (181i)
(according to Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 653 (1930), the first reported
decision on this conflict of jurisdiction problem).
21 These include: workmen's compensation applicable to persons in enclave, 49
Stat. 1938 (1936), 40 U.S.C. § 290 (1952); unemployment compensation applicable
to persons in enclave, 53 Stat. 1392 (1939), 26 U.S.C. § i6o6(d) (1952); state law shall
apply in cases involving wrongful death or injury of a person in an enclave, 45
Stat. 54 (1928), 16 U.S.C. § 457 (1952); states may impose tax on motor fuels, and
sales, use, and income taxes on transactions occurring in an enclave, 61 Stat. 644,
645 (1947), as amended, 4 U.S.C. §§ 104-10 (1952), as amended, 4 U.S.C. §§ 104, 107
(Supp. V, 1958); taxation of leasehold interests in federal property located in an
enclave, 1o U.S.C. § 2667(e) (Supp. V, 1958); and retrocession of jurisdiction to the
states pertaining to the administration of estates of residents of Veterans' Adminis-
tration facilities, 52 Stat. 1192 (1938), 38 U.S.C. § 16g (1952).
"With growing frequency the federal government leaves largely unimpaired
the civil and criminal authority of the state over national reservations or proper-
ties." James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 101 (1940). See 30 Stat. 688
(1898) (jurisdiction receded to states over places purchased for branches of soldiers'
homes); 49 Stat. 688 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 465 (1952) (waiver of federal jurisdiction for
historic sites); 49 Stat. 2025 (1936), 40 U.S.C. § 421 (1952) (same for slum clearance
and low-cost housing under Public Works Administration); 49 Stat. 2035 (1936), later
repealed due to liquidation of federal holdings by 6o Stat. io67 (1946), 7 US.C. §
1017 (1952) (same for resettlement and rural rehabilitation); and 50 Stat. 895 (1937),
42 U.S.C. § 1413(b) (1952) (same for acquisitions of United States Housing Authority).
This listing is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely indicative of the areas in
which Congress has legislated for territories under its jurisdiction.
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citizens of such territories are not citizens of the state25 and, while not
subject to the obligations of state citizens, neither are they entitled to
any of the benefits conferred upon such citizens. They cannot vote,
26
stand for election,2 7 have access as a matter of right to state schools, 28
avail themselves of state probate proceedings,29 or be granted a divorce
occurred within these areas has been partially cured by congressional
enactment, 31 and by court adoption of a rule similar to that of inter-
national law.3 2 But even this does not solve the problem, as the inter-
national law rule presupposes that the new sovereign will act to keep
the laws of the ceded areas up-to-date. This has been accomplished to
a fairly great extent only in the area of criminal law by the passage of
the Assimilative Crimes Act.
33
Thus, where Congress has not by statute allowed the state to act,
the fact that exclusive jurisdiction is in the United States precludes
any state jurisdiction other than service of process. This was certainly
j"[I]t is not constitutionally competent for the general assembly to confer
the elective franchise upon persons whose legal status is fixed as non-residents of
the State .... " Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306, 319 (1869). In this case the issue was
whether inmates of a federal asylum could vote in a state election.
n4Herken v. Glynn, 151 Kan. 855, 101 P.2d 946 (1940); In re Town of Highlands,
22 N.Y. Supp. 137 (Sup. Ct. 1892); Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306 (1869); McMahon
v. Polk, 1o S.D. 296 (1897).
Generally, see note 26 supra, as the qualifications for holding public office
are the same as for voting. But see Adams v. Londeree, 139 W. Va. 748, 83 S.E.2d
127 (1954).
'Schwartz v. O'Hara Township School Dist., 375 Pa. 44o, 1oo A.2d 621 (1953);
Opinion of the Justices, i Metc. 580, 583 (Mass. 1841).
2Lowe v. Lowe, iso Md. 592, 133 At. 729, 733 (1926) (concurring opinion).
in state courts.30 The legislative void which might otherwise have
n°Dicks v. Dicks, 177 Ga. 379, 170 S.F. 245 (1933); Lowe v. Lowe, ixo Md. 592, 133
Atl. 729 (1926); Chaney v. Chaney, 53 N.M. 66, 20oi P.2d 782 (1949). The domestic
relations problems involving residents of federal enclaves is heightened by the fact
that the federal courts will not entertain such suits. "We disclaim altogether any jur-
isdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the al-
lowance of alimony...." Barker v. Barker, 62 U.S. 582 (1858). Interesting problems
dealing with the opposite side of divorce may also be imagined, since there is no
federal law relating to marriage. See generally Note, 1o U. Pa. L. Rev. 124 (1952).
"E.g., see note 24 supra.
32Cf. Committee Report, Pt. I, 15. "[W]hen one sovereign takes over territory of
another the laws of the original sovereign in effect at the time of the taking which
are not inconsistent with the laws or policies of the second continue in effect, as
laws of the succeeding sovereign, until changed by that sovereign." Committee Re-
port, Pt. II, 6.
"54 Stat. 234 (1940); 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). This act differs from the international
law rule in that it provides for the application of the state laws in effect at the time
of the offense, and not at the time the federal government acquired jurisdiction over
the territory. Cf. note 32 supra.
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so in 193o,34 and it appears to have been true as late as 1934.35 But
three years later, in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,86 the Supreme
Court made the first significant inroad into the concept of exclusive
jurisdiction. The United States acquired lands from West Virginia to
erect dams for the improvement of navigable streams. 37 The West
Virginia legislature, by a general statute, had given its consent to the
acquisition of such lands by the United States, but had reserved to the
state concurrent jurisdiction.38 The specific question involved was
whether West Virginia could impose a tax on the gross amounts
received by Dravo from contracts with the United States for the con-
struction of the dams. Even though the acquisition of the lands fell
under clause 17, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the tax-
ing statute, thereby determining that a consent statute does not have to
give exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government.3 9 By dictum,
this same principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in 193840 and
again in 1940.41 In 1940, Congress amended section 355 of the Re-
vised Statutes42 so that the United States would not be required to ob-
tain exclusive jurisdiction over lands acquired by it under clause 17.43
-"Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
t5Standard Oil Co. of California v. California, 291 U.S. 242, 245 (1934) (dictum),
rehearing denied, 291 U.S. 650 (1934).
3302 U.S. 134 (1937).
""Locks and dams for the improvement of navigation ... have been regarded
as 'needful buildings' [within the meaning of clause 17] [citation omitted]. We
take that view." James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).
'W. Va. Code Ann. § 3 (1955)-
'See James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1937).
"0"The States of the Union and the National Government may make mutually
satisfactory arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within their borders ....
Jurisdiction obtained by consent or cession may be qualified by agreement or
through offer and acceptance or ratification. It is a matter of arrangement. These
arrangements the courts will recognize and respect." Collins v. Yosemite Park &
Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528 (1938).
,""It is now settled that the jurisdiction acquired from a State by the United
States whether by consent to the purchase or by cession may be qualified in ac-
cordance with agreements reached by the respective governments. The Constitution
does not command that every vestige of the laws of the former sovereignty must
vanish .... This assures that no area however small will be left without a developed
legal system for private rights." James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 3o9 U.S. 94, 99
(1940).
4-See note 20 supra.
354 Stat. 19 (1940), 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1952), amending Rev. Stat. § 355 (1875),
as amended. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the obtaining of ex-
clusive jurisdiction in the United States over lands or interests therein which
have been or shall hereafter be acquired by it shall not be required; but the head
or other authorized officer of any department ... of the Government may... accept
or secure from the State in which any lands or interests therein ... are situated,
consent to or cession of such jurisdiction, exclusive or partial ... as he may deem
desirable...."
1958]
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Thus, at the present time, it would seem that the same results
are reached whether the United States acquired jurisdiction under
clause 17, or by state cession or federal reservation. In either case, the
state may retain concurrent jurisdiction, though still not without cer-
tain restrictions. The limit on the exercise by the states of their con-
current jurisdiction seems to have been expressed best by the Supreme
Court in the Dravo case: "We hold that the [state] tax so far as it...
does not interfere in any substantial way with the performance of fed-
eral functions.., is a valid exaction."
44
II. THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM
The present status of state lands over which the United States has
acquired jurisdiction is not as clear as the foregoing Supreme Court de-
cisions seem to indicate, at least so far as state taxation of private prop-
erty located on such lands is concerned. This may best be seen in three
recent decisions, based on equivalent factual situations.4 5 The Inter-
national Business Machines Corporation had leased to the United States
certain of its machines, which were located on federally-acquired prop-
erty. In each state there were statutes giving the consent by the state to
the transfer to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over lands
within the state acquired by the national government, and in each case
the state concerned, or one of its subdivisions, levied a tax on this pri-
vate property. IBM sought to avoid the tax.
4 6
In International Business Machines Corp. v. Vaughn,4" the Florida
Supreme Court reasoned that since the state legislature had ceded
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government, reserving only the
right of service of process, the state could not subsequently tax the
private property of IBM located on the ceded lands. The state argued
that the corporation's property located on an air force base was sub-
ject to taxation since not being utilized for one of the specifically
enumerated exempted uses mentioned in the Florida constitution.4 8
The Florida court, however, expressly rejected the argument that the
organic law of the state requiring taxes to be levied should be taken as
a part of the transaction of cession.49 "[T]he pivotal point is not 'use'
but 'jurisdiction.' "50 Thus, since the state had ceded exclusive juris-
"James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937).
OSee notes 47, 53, 64 infra.
16In two of the cases, the action was for an injunction to restrain collection
of the taxes; in the third, IBM sought recovery of taxes already paid.
4798 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1957).
'8Fla. Const. art. XVI, § 6.
4998 So. 2d at 75o.
rO98 So. 2d at 748.
242
CASE COMMENTS
diction to the United States over the lands involved,51 "the jurisdiction
cannot be disturbed by tax gatherers because the right to tax was not
reserved and the consent of the United States to tax was not given. '52
One year earlier, a different approach had been taken by the Louis-
iana Supreme Court in International Business Machine Corp. v. Ott.
5 3
As to lands acquired by the federal government prior to February i,
194,5 4 the court reasoned that, on the authority of James v. Dravo
Contracting Co.55 and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Wash-
ington,50 the United States did not have to accept exclusive jurisdic-
tion, and that the amount of jurisdiction the United States in fact
did acquire must be based on how much it accepted, not how much
it was offered.57 As the United States had made use of various facili-
ties furnished by the City of New Orleans (fire protection, sewerage,
water and drainage service, traffic regulation), the court felt that the ac-
ceptance of such services was evidence of an intent contrary to ex-
clusive jurisdiction.58 "We think, upon further analysis and study, that
the rule of Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook [citation omitted] it [is?] not
to be applied to the instant factual situation."5 9 Thus, the state could
properly tax IBM's property.
As to lands within the state acquired after February i, 194o, the
court found that the United States had not accepted either exclusive
or partial jurisdiction according to the requirements of Title 40, U.S.C.
section 255,00 without which it is conclusively presumed that such
"Reserving only the right of service of process. Fla. Stat. Ann., tit. 2, c. 6, § 6.04
(1953).
"98 So. 2d at 750.
F23o La. 666, 89 So. 2d 193 (1956). The problem dealing with property located
on lands leased to the federal government is not discussed here.
"This date was critical in the court's mind, evidently, as being the date on which
the amendment to Rev. Stat. § 355 (1875), 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1934), was passed. See
notes 2o and 43 supra.
r53o2 U.S. 134 (1937).
r.3o2 U.S. 186 (1937).
0"The fact that the Legislature of a State has ceded exclusive jurisdiction is
not the controlling consideration; reference must be had to the circumstances of the
case, which may well be evidence of intention on the part of the United States not
to accept the grant." 89 So. 2d at 2o6. The facts of this case do not differ materially
from those of Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (193o).
c3As to the using of the city's facilities, the dissent mentioned that the court
"cannot condemn the Government for using these services on the payment of a
small fee." 89 So. 2d at 2o8 (dissenting opinion).
c89 So. 2d at 206. The dissent felt differently, however. "Precedent and authori-
ty supports the contentions of the plaintiff: ... 3. An unreversed decision of the
United States Supreme Court-the Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook [citation omitted].
This decision is as reliable as the attraction of gravity; there is no shadow of turn-
ing." 89 So. 2d at 2o7 (dissenting opinion).
wSee notes 43 and 54 supra.
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jurisdiction has not been accepted. Therefore, the state may also levy
a tax on private property located on these lands.
Although the Florida and Louisiana decisions reach opposite re-
sults, there is an element of similarity betwen them in that each court
was looking at a different side of the same coin-i.e., Florida was
concerned with the amount of jurisdiction offered to the federal
government by the state, and Louisiana was looking to the amount of
jurisdiction accepted by the United States. It should be noted that
the United States cannot acquire jurisdiction by a unilateral action,61
and to this extent the Florida court seems correct in its analysis. But
something else is required to complete the transfer of jurisdiction-
acceptance by the federal government. The 194o amendment to sec-
tion 355 of the Revised Statutes expressly requires formal federal accept-
ance prior to the transfer of exclusive or partial jurisdiction. 62 Before
this amendment, acceptance was likewise required, but it was presumed
from acquiescence by the national government in the absence of an
express acceptance. 63 Thus, it appears that the Louisiana court, in go-
ing a step beyond the Florida court and looking to the amount of
jurisdiction accepted by the federal government, has taken a correct
approach.
During the interim between these two decisions, the Supreme Court
of Georgia decided International Business Machines Corp. v. Evans,
04
which, like the Louisiana decision, permitted the state to levy an ad
valorem property tax on the machines leased by IBM to an air force
base in Georgia. The court reasoned that since the Georgia constitution
denies to the state "the authority to irrevocably give, grant, limit, or
restrain this right [of taxation of corporations]," 65 then the statutes
OHere it is important to distinguish between the acquisition of land and the
acquisition of jurisdiction. The offer by the state (or its consent to federal acquisition)
relates to jurisdiction over the lands (governmental control), not to the title of
the lands (proprietary control). The consent of the state is not necessary as to the
acquisition of land within its boundaries by the United States. Cf. United States
v. Mayor and Council of City of Hoboken, 29 F.2d 932, 942-46 (D. N.J. 1928).
6"54 Stat. 19 (1940), 40 U.S.C. § 255 (1952), amending Rev. Stat. § 355 (1875),
as amended. "[A]nd indicate acceptance of such jurisdiction on behalf of the
United States by filing a notice of such acceptance with the Governor of such State
or in such other manner as may be prescribed by the laws of the State where such
lands are situated. Unless and until the United States has accepted jurisdiction over
lands hereafter to be acquired as aforesaid, it shall be conclusively presumed that no
such jurisdiction has been accepted.'
"See Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 3o2 U.S. 186, 207
(1937); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 330 (1892); Fort Leavenworth R.R.
v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885); United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 648, No.
14,867 (C.C.D.R.I. 1819).
4213 Ga. 333, 99 S.E.2d 220 (1957).
"Ga. Const. art. 7, § 1, par. i; Ga. Code Ann. § 2-5401 (1945).
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ceding exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over the lands in
question66 must be void "to the extent that they undertake to waive
the sovereign right of Georgia to tax. ... 67 Even though the United
States Constitution authorizes the federal government to accept ex-
clusive jurisdiction where the state consents to the purchase of lands,
"that which the State Constitution forbids the legislature to do, the Con-
stitution of the United States cannot require done .... Nothing in the
Constitution of the United States can confer upon the Georgia Legis-
lature, an iota of power to legislate for Georgia." 6
Like Louisiana, Georgia reaches a result different from that of
Florida, but here the two courts are looking at opposite sides of an-
other coin. The Florida decision seems to indicate that the state can
exercise only those powers it has specifically reserved in the cession or
consent statute. This holding, when considered in conjunction with
the Florida constitution, 69 must necessarily indicate that when a cession
takes place, the territory so ceded ceases to be governed by the constitu-
tion. It becomes, in effect, a federal island free of any state control
or regulation. As the constitution of Florida does not apply-since the
striking down of such a tax does not violate the constitutional require-
ment that a tax be levied on corporate property within the state-it
then must follow that the ceded territory is "outside" the state. 70
The Georgia court was faced with the same problem. In the Georgia
constitution, as in the Florida constitution, there appears to be nothing
forbidding the cession to the United States of exclusive jurisdiction
over lands acquired by the federal government. But here the court
"Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-3o (25), 15-302 (26), 15-303 (1945).
0799 S.E.2d at 225.
6399 S.E.2d at 222. Another "argument" put by the court follows: "We would
never for one second deliberately render a judgment today that we would not be
perfectly willing to follow tomorrow. If we would not today be willing to follow
it tomorrow, we certainly will not render it today. It is inconceivable that this
court would ever uphold an act of the legislature which surrendered the sovereignty
of Georgia over every foot of Georgia's land. Such a ruling would even abolish this
court. The legislature has no such power. The fact that we would not so hold is
a compelling reason for our refusing to rule today that it can surrender sovereignty
over a part of Georgia's territory." 99 S.E.2d at 223. Such an argument was presented
in the Ninth Circuit in 1929. The court there countered that "such a contingency
is possible, but improbable, and the situation must be met when it arises. Suffice
it to say that no such question is here involved." Yellowstone Park Transp. Co. v.
Gallatin County, 31 F.2d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 1929).
c-"The property of all corporations... shall be subject to taxation. Fla.
Const. art. XVI, § 16.
71This point is not specifically discussed in the opinion. However, it may be
what the court had in mind when, in speaking of the exemptions from this taxa-
tion, it said: "But the pivotal point is not 'use' but 'jurisdiction'." 98 So. 2d at 748.
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did not look at the effect of such a cession, once it was made, for if it
had, it would seem that the Florida approach would not have violated
the Georgia constitution-i.e., if the lands ceded were "without" the
state, then the constitution would not be applicable to those lands.
71
Rather, the court seems to have assumed that any lands actually
within the physical borders of the state were under the effect of the
state's constitution, and, consequently, the right of taxation could
never be surrendered as to those lands.
III. THREE COINS IN THE FOUNTAIN
Which one will the High Court bless? It would appear a confus-
ing anomaly to say that the United States Supreme Court would affirm
each of these decisions, were they presented on appeal. Yet, in spite
of the resultant dichotomy, a synthesis might lie in just this confusion.
It is, of course, pure speculation to imagine what the Supreme Court-
or any court, for that matter-would do with a specific problem that
might come before it, but in that speculation is found the joy of
prophecy or the pangs of error.
If IBM appealed the Louisiana decision, it would have to overcome
the strong argument that the United States did not accept exclusive
jurisdiction over the lands in question. As regards those lands ac-
quired after the 1940 amendment, it seems that the state's position is
sound, if, as was determined by the Louisiana court, the United States
had not complied with the terms of the amendment in formally ac-
cepting jurisdiction. As to the lands acquired before the amendment,
IBM is in a better position in that no express acceptance is required,
and in that acceptance was generally presumed. 72 But a presumption is
rebuttable. Here, there was no federal act stating that the United States
had exclusive jurisdiction;73 the national government had made use of
city-offered utilities; 74 and the state's action in taxing the property of
IBM was not inconsistent with the federal purpose in holding the
lands.75 The state might tender another valid argument based on the
7'Georgia may not tax property located without its territorial jurisdiction. Davis
v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 198 Ga. 550, 32 S.E.2d i8o (1944); National Mortgage Corp.
v. Suttles, 194 Ga. 768, 22 S.E.2d 386 (1942); Suttles v. Northwestern Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 193 Ga. 495, 19 S.E.2d 396 (1942); Montag Bros., Inc. v. State Revenue Com-
mission of Georgia, 5o Ga. 66o, 179 S.E. 563 (935)-
72Fort Leavenworth R.R.v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885); United States ex rel.
Bowen v. Johnston, 58 F. Supp. 208, 209 (N.D. Cal. 1944), aff'd, 146 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 876 (1944); United States v. Watkins, 22 F.2d 437,
44o (N.D. Cal. 1927); Pound v. Gaulding, 237 Ala. 387, 187 So. 468, 470 (1939).
13See 89 So. 2d at 206.
",See 89 So. 2d at 206.
'5See 89 So. 2d at 205.
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fact that the United States seems anxious to exercise only that amount
of jurisdiction needed to perform its operations, since the federal gov-
ernment has grown so large, and its holdings expanded so extensively,
that in the modern-day world it cannot efficiently manage each separate
area under its exclusive jurisdiction.
If the tax commissioner were to appeal the Florida decision, IBM
could offer a cogent argument for affirmance. The contemporary view
recognizes that the United States does not to have to acquire exclusive
jurisdiction over the lands it needs for its operations.76 Nevertheless,
when a state does cede exclusive jurisdiction in accordance with the
terms of the Constitution, then the federal government does have ex-
ciusive jurisdiction. As Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook77 has not been
overruled, the state is without authority to levy the tax in this situation.
Since the Florida Supreme Court appeared to be aware of the effect
of the decision in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,7s IBM could meet
in advance the argument that the Supreme Court should vacate the
Florida decision on the ground that Florida felt compelled by its
interpretation of constitutional law to hold that the United States
had to have exclusive jurisdicton over the lands in question.
If IBM should appeal the Georgia decision, the Supreme Court
might affirm it as well. The actual reasoning in the Georgia decision
presents only a part of the argument that the state would have to use
before the Supreme Court-i.e., that although the act of the General
Assembly appears to have given exclusive jurisdiction to the United
States, it in fact did not. The state, under its constitution, did not have
the power to pass such an act, and therefore, to the extent that the act
was violative of the Georgia constitution, it was void. The state's po-
sition is strengthened by the Supreme Court's statement in United
States v. Unzeuta: "The terms of the cession, to the extent that they
may lawfully be prescribed, determined the extent of the Federal
jurisdiction." 79 If this argument is accepted, then Georgia would ap-
pear to be on safe ground, since it would have no difficulty in showing
that it is not necessary for the United States to have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in order to perform its functions on the air force base. 0
When this problem of jurisdiction is viewed from the federal side,
there appears to be little doubt that even though the United States has
"James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 3o2 U.S. 134 (1937); 54 Stat. 19 (1940), 40
U.S.C. § 255 (1952).
7'281 U.S. 647 (1930).
18See 98 So. 2d at 749.
7"281 U.S. 138, 142 (193o). (Emphasis added.)
See note 76 supra.
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